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By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the 
relation between monetary gift-exchange  and incentive pay, while allowing for worker 
heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they 
are convinced that the principal cares for them. The principal can be egoistic or altruistic. 
Absent worker heterogeneity, an altruistic principal signals his altruism by offering relatively 
weak incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. However, the latter is not 
always required to credibly signal altruism. Furthermore, since  some workers do not 
reciprocate the principal’s altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that 
simultaneously signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. Such a contract is 
characterised by excessively strong incentives and a relatively high  expected total 
compensation. 
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Economists generally recognise that human￿ s pecuniary motives are not the
only determinant of economic outcomes: other considerations play a sig-
ni￿cant role as well. One of these considerations that has received lots of
attention recently is reciprocity, meaning that people are willing to promote
the welfare of a kind person and reduce the welfare of an unkind person, even
if it comes at a personal cost. The importance of reciprocal motivations in
the workplace has been brought under the attention of economists by Ak-
erlof￿ s (1982) seminal paper on the gift-exchange hypothesis. He describes
labor contracts as a gift-exchange between employers and employees, where
employee￿ s e⁄ort and employer￿ s generous treatment of workers are reciprocal
gifts.
Generous treatment of employees encompasses several aspects. Of all the
aspects mentioned by Akerlof, the wage level has without doubt attracted
most attention. The idea that workers reciprocate high wages by exerting
more e⁄ort has been the subject of considerable empirical examination. Nu-
merous laboratory experiments ￿nd a positive relation between employee￿ s
e⁄ort and the salary o⁄ered by the employer, although recent ￿eld studies
are somewhat less supportive.1
In the light of these substantial e⁄orts to empirically test the gift-exchange
hypothesis, the limited amount of theoretical investigation is surprising. For
instance, little is known about how employers optimally induce reciprocity
when they do not only decide on the wage level, but also on the level of per-
formance pay. Since monetary incentives are an essential element of labour
contracts, the perceived generosity of a contract o⁄er may well depend on its
incentive intensity.
This paper studies this question by allowing for reciprocity in an other-
wise standard principal-agent model. Thus, the principal decides on a base
salary and a piece rate to compensate the worker. Workers are risk-averse
and not protected by limited-liability. Although risk-aversion is a common
assumption in agency models, its interaction with reciprocity is still an open
question. Risk aversion is likely to a⁄ect the optimal composition of a gift, as
workers are not neutral with respect to the variance of their expected income.
The modeling of reciprocity is inspired by Levine (1998)￿ s game-theoretic
approach. This approach is based on the idea that to many workers, it mat-
ters whether their boss cares about them as a person or views them merely
as a means to an end. The key assumption is that workers are conditionally
1An early experimental study is Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). Fehr and G￿chter
(2000) survey the voluminous literature. See Dur et al. (2010) for an overview of recent
￿eld experiments.
1altruistic: they care more about the principal￿ s welfare when they sense that
the principal cares for them. Speci￿cally, I assume that the principal is either
altruistic or sel￿sh, and that conditionally altruistic workers are altruistic to
the extent that they believe that the principal is an altruist. Thus, condi-
tionally altruistic workers reciprocate a favor not because of the favor itself,
but rather because it signals that the employer cares for them.
An advantage of this approach is that it o⁄ers a tractable way to distin-
guish between authentic and strategic kindness. When workers reciprocate
a high wage by exerting more e⁄ort, an egoistic principal may want to pay a
generous wage for strategic reasons: not because he cares about the workers￿
well-being, but because he wants to maximize his own pro￿ts. This con-
cealed egoism puts the principal￿ s generosity in a completely di⁄erent light.
Workers may therefore not automatically reciprocate high wages, but only
when they sense that this kindness is genuine, rather than strategic. There
is considerable experimental evidence that people do not only care about
distributional outcomes, but are also concerned about the intentions behind
an action (see e.g. Charness and Levine, 2007, and the references therein).
Apart from the abundant experimental evidence, the relevance of intentions
is also apparent in our criminal law system: sentence length depends not
exclusively on the harm in￿ icted on the other party, but to a large extent on
whether the harm was caused intentionally or by accident.
Although reciprocity is often considered to have a strong in￿ uence on
labour contracts (see e.g. Bewley, 1999), a typical ￿nding in laboratory ex-
periments is that not all individuals are equally motivated by reciprocal ten-
dencies. For example, in a three-person gift-exchange experiment by G￿chter
and Th￿ni (2010) about 25% of experimental subjects classify as ￿ egoistic￿ ,
meaning that they are unwilling to exert e⁄ort regardless of the wage they
and their colleague receive. Similar patterns are reported by Fischbacher et
al. (2001) and Fischbacher and G￿chter (2010) in the context of a public
goods experiment. This heterogeneity in reciprocity raises the issue whether
employers can possibly screen workers, and whether they ￿nd it pro￿table
to do so. To investigate this issue, I assume throughout that not all workers
are conditionally altruistic: some workers are exclusively motivated by their
own material interest. I examine whether an altruistic principal can write a
contract that signals his altruism, and at the same time screens conditionally
altruistic workers.
The main focus of the paper is to characterize contracts that induce reci-
procity, assuming the principal refrains from screening workers. The ￿rst
result is that an altruistic principal o⁄ers weaker incentives than an egoistic
principal, while at the same time increasing the base salary to ensure that
he is viewed as an altruist. The reason is that a tight link between pay and
2performance is not necessary when workers are convinced of the principal￿ s
kindness: strong incentives add little to the worker￿ s productivity, but they
do expose workers to (unnecessary) risk. O⁄ering strong incentives is there-
fore suboptimal for a principal who really cares about the worker￿ s well-being.
Thus, weak incentives can be considered as part of the altruistic principal￿ s
gift to the worker.
The assumption of risk aversion is essential to this result. When workers
would be risk-neutral, the principal can resolve all agency problems simply
by equating the piece rate with the marginal product. By contrast, worker￿ s
risk aversion induces the principal to set the piece rate below the marginal
product, and reciprocity can be helpful to further align the interest of the
worker and the principal.
The second ￿nding is related to the ￿rst and quali￿es the standard re-
sult, namely that employers induce reciprocity by paying a relatively high
expected total compensation. Because part of the altruistic principal￿ s gift
is a reduction in incentives, he need not necessarily pay a higher expected
total compensation than an egoistic principal to signal his altruism. The
reason is that, since an altruistic principal provides workers with little ex-
plicit incentives to exert e⁄ort, workers￿e⁄ort may be relatively low, despite
their altruistic feelings towards the principal. As a result, pretending to be
an altruistic principal is not particularly pro￿table for an egoistic principal,
implying that a relatively low total compensation su¢ ces to distinguish both
types. Thus, the interaction between incentives, risk-aversion, and consider-
ations of strategic kindness may divert the usual positive relation between
wages and e⁄ort. An altruistic principal pays a higher expected total com-
pensation than an egoistic principal only if increased worker motivation leads
to sizeable productivity gains, for instance because incentivizing workers via
￿nancial incentives is costly due to strong risk aversion.
The third result is that an altruistic principal may ￿nd it optimal to
write a contract that signals his benevolent intentions, and simultaneously
selects conditionally altruistic workers. Perhaps surprisingly, this is accom-
plished by setting excessively strong incentives and paying a relatively high
expected total compensation. The reason for setting strong incentives is that
conditionally altruistic workers exert more e⁄ort than egoistic workers, and
hence have more to gain from an increase in pay-for-performance than egois-
tic workers. Thus, the paradox is that strong incentives are o⁄ered in order
to attract the employees who need them the least.
These ￿ndings relate to a broad literature on the signaling value of in-
centives. In particular, the ￿nding that in the absence of screening mo-
tives, an altruistic principal induces reciprocity by o⁄ering weaker incentives
than an egoistic principal, is well in line with recent experimental evidence.
3Several experimental studies ￿nd that incentives are hard to reconcile with
reciprocity-induced voluntary cooperation. For instance, a laboratory ex-
periment by Falk and Kosfeld (2006) shows that the implementation of a
minimum e⁄ort requirement reduces e⁄ort, because a considerable group of
individuals interpret such an action as a sign of distrust. The implementation
of a ￿ne in case e⁄ort does not meet a prescribed level has a similar e⁄ect, as
shown by Fehr and G￿chter (2002) and Fehr and List (2004). Their exper-
imental evidence shows that, in the words of Fehr and List (2004, p. 743),
"incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking back￿re by inducing
less trustworthy behavior". Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) provide the-
oretical underpinnings for this behavior, arguing that control systems and
incentives signal that the principal is not worth impressing. Likewise, Sliwka
(2007) argues that incentives signal that sel￿sh behavior is the social norm,
which demotivates the conformistic agents in the population. These models
crucially di⁄er from the model presented here in that esteem and conformism
drive the results, instead of reciprocity.
These ￿ndings extend to a more natural setting where the principal not
only decides on controlling or trusting the agent, but also on a wage level.
Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Bartling et al. (2011) ￿nd that when employers
have the opportunity to control the agent by limiting his e⁄ort discretion,
employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low e⁄ort
discretion and low wages, or a trust strategy, which consists of high e⁄ort
discretion and substantial wages. This suggests that paying a high wage and
at the same time limiting a worker￿ s e⁄ort discretion are con￿ icting signals.
Controlling the worker therefore reduces the e⁄ectiveness of a wage gift.2
As noted above, this di¢ culty to reconcile incentives with voluntary co-
operation is in line with my model. An important di⁄erence, however, is that
I look at another type of incentives, namely piece rates instead of minimum
e⁄ort requirements. As a result, in my model incentives are not necessarily
viewed negatively. This allows altruistic employers to signal their altruism
and at the same time screen workers by o⁄ering relatively strong incentives
and a high expected total compensation.
2This phenomenon is also referred to as partial-crowding out (Fehr and G￿chter, 2002):
keeping the wage constant, voluntary cooperation is lower when (stronger) incentives are
implemented, where voluntary cooperation is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between actual
and privately optimal e⁄ort. Fehr and G￿chter (2002) and Bellemare and Shearer (2011)
provide evidence in line with the partial-crowding hypothesis.
In my model, the reason for crowding is that a high piece rate diminishes the share of
the marginal product that accrues to the principal, and therefore restricts the worker￿ s
opportunities to reciprocate the principal￿ s favourable treatment. Hence, a tight link
between e⁄ort and monetary reward reduces the principal￿ s return to signaling altruism.
4The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the related
literature. Section 3 sets out the model. Section 4 analyzes the observable
types case, which serves as a benchmark for the analysis in section 5 where
types are assumed to be unobservable. There, I ￿rst show that pooling equi-
libria do not exist, and then proceed to the analysis of separating equilibria.
Finally, in section 6 I conclude and provide some avenues for further research.
2 Related literature
In economics, several authors have suggested ways of modeling reciprocity
and underlying intentions, for example Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004), Falk and Fischbacher (2006) and Battigalli and
Dufwenberg (2009). Our model is based on Levine￿ s approach because it pro-
vides a tractable and natural way to model the ￿ndings reported in organiza-
tional psychology and management: when employees infer that their manager
or the organization cares about their well-being, they reciprocate with in-
creased commitment, loyalty, and performance (see, for example, the reviews
by Rhoades and Eisenberger 2002 and Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). As
pointed out by Gul and Pesendorfer (2010), this approach facilitates analysis
and allows to distinguish between genuine kindness and instrumental kind-
ness.
Despite the recent attention for modeling reciprocal behavior in the work-
place, there are only few studies that investigate the relation between reci-
procity and monetary incentives: Englmaier and Leider (2008), Arbak and
Kranich (2005), and Bellemare and Shearer (2011). Compared to these stud-
ies, the key innovation is that I account for worker￿ s risk-aversion as well as
a concern for the intentions of the employer. The interaction between these
assumptions plays a critical role when deriving the employer￿ s optimal choice
of base salary and bonus payments.
Englmaier and Leider (2008) incorporate reciprocity in a principal-agent
model with risk averse agents. Their main ￿nding is that incentive pay
and reciprocal motivations are substitutes, which is qualitatively in line with
my results. The key di⁄erence is that Englmaier and Leider largely ignore
the importance of intentions, and instead assume that positive reciprocity is
automatically induced when agents expect to receive a rent.
A working paper by Arbak and Kranich (2005) is closely related in the
sense that incomplete information and Levine-type conditional altruism are
key features of their modeling set-up. They assume that employers signal
their type by increasing piece rates, but fail to analyze the case where em-
ployers can also resort to the base salary as a signaling tool.
5In a related model, Bellemare and Shearer (2011) address this shortcom-
ing. They ￿nd that employers induce reciprocity by increasing piece rates
rather than by increasing the base salary. The main reason is that piece rates
have a direct incentivizing e⁄ect, in addition to the e⁄ect of the reciprocity
induced by the gift. This result follows from their assumption that work-
ers are risk neutral and that a limited-liability constraint is always binding.
Therefore, in the absence of a signaling motive piece rates are suboptimally
low. As higher piece rates bring workers￿incentives closer to the socially
optimal level, the most e¢ cient way to signal kindness is by increasing in-
centives. By contrast, in my paper stronger incentives expose workers to
more risk, which is costly. Thus, assuming that workers are risk averse and
unconstrained by limited-liability crucially a⁄ects the optimal composition
of a wage gift.
Another paper that studies the relation between reciprocal motivations
and incentive pay is Dur et al. (2010). However, their model does not al-
low for monetary gift-exchange, but focuses on social gift-exchange instead,
meaning that the resources of the gift-exchange are non-monetary.3 In par-
ticular, in Dur et al. (2010), the manager￿ s gift exclusively consists of man-
agement attention. Another limitation is that they do not allow for strategic
kindness of the principal. Both limitations are addressed by Dur (2009), but
his model does not allow for incentive pay.
Another topic I address is how contracts can select reciprocal worker types
and at the same time signal the principal￿ s altruism. Interestingly, Kosfeld
and Von Siemens (2009, 2011) investigate how employers use a combination of
base salary and performance pay to screen reciprocal workers. An important
di⁄erence is that they concentrate on reciprocity between colleagues who
work in a team, rather than between worker and principal. The principal￿ s
contract o⁄er therefore does not signal private information.
Sliwka (2007) does not study reciprocity, but he also studies contracts
that signal the principal￿ s private information and at the same time screen
workers. As noted above, the main idea in his paper is that incentives signal
that sel￿sh behavior is the social norm, which demotivates the conformistic
agents in the population. In addition to this signaling e⁄ect, incentives can
also screen worker types when sel￿sh and altruistic workers di⁄er in their
3As argued by Akerlof (1982), manager￿ s benevolent treatment of workers encompasses
several aspects. Studies in management and organizational psychology distinguish be-
tween two broad categories: economic resources and socioemotional resources. Economic
resources address "￿nancial needs and tend to be tangible", whereas socioemotional re-
sources address "social and esteem needs (and are often symbolic and particularistic)."
(Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005, p. 881) In economics, monetary gift-exchange refers to
the former, whereas social gift-exchange in the cited papers refers to the latter.
6preferences over incentive intensity. Hence, the optimal decision whether to
trust or to incentivize agents takes both the signaling and selection e⁄ect
into account. An important di⁄erence with my analysis, however, is that in
Sliwka the principal faces the binary decision whether to trust or incentivize
workers, whereas in my model the principal has two continuous instruments
(wage and base salary) at his disposal. Therefore, the principal has richer
opportunities to simultaneously signal to and screen workers.4
3 The model
I consider a risk-neutral principal who is hiring one worker from a large popu-
lation of workers. Workers are risk-averse and some of them are conditionally
altruistic, meaning that the extent to which the worker is altruistic depends





This speci￿cation is widely used to describe the utility of risk-averse agents,
where r > 0 captures the extent of risk-aversion. Production is simply given
by e⁄ort e, but is prone to random shocks " that are normally distributed
with variance ￿2. E⁄ort is non-contractible, but assuming that output can
be observed, the worker earns a share b of observed output (e+") and a base
salary denoted by s. The worker￿ s costs of e⁄ort are represented by 1
2￿e2.
Furthermore, ￿i(￿j) captures the strength of the worker￿ s altruism towards
his principal, which positively depends on the principal￿ s altruism ￿j. Note
that the worker cares about the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ E(￿j) instead of
his actual payo⁄￿j. The reason is that it would be nonsensical to assume that
the worker is risk-averse over the payo⁄ of a risk-neutral principal. Workers
di⁄er in their altruism function ￿i(￿j), where 0 ￿ ￿i(￿j) < 1. I distinguish
between a worker￿ s ￿ type￿and a worker￿ s ￿ altruism￿ . A worker￿ s ￿ type￿refers
to his altruism function, whereas his ￿ altruism￿refers to the outcome of the
function ￿i(￿j). The typespace is speci￿ed below.
As is common in the literature, I remove the uncertainty on " from the
worker￿ s utility function by deriving the certainty equivalent, which allows
4To the best of my knowledge, the only other paper that designs a contract that sig-
nals information to and at the same time screens the other contracting party, using two
continuous instruments, is Soberman (2003).
7for convenient transformation of the utility function into:5









2 + ￿i(￿j)E(￿j): (2)
An increase in the bonus exposes the worker to more risk, which subtracts
from the positive e⁄ect of the bonus on the worker￿ s utility. To ensure that
an increase in the bonus does not expose the worker to so much additional
risk that his utility is lowered, I assume throughout that r￿2￿ ￿ 1.6
The expected payo⁄ of a principal of type j is described by
E(￿j) = (1 ￿ b)e ￿ s + ￿jE(ui); (3)
where ￿jE(ui) captures the altruistic feelings of the principal.7 Analogous
to the workers, I assume that 0 ￿ ￿j < 1. Principals di⁄er in type ￿j,
implying that the worker￿ s altruism depends on the speci￿c match between
the worker￿ s and the principal￿ s type.
Types are private information. There are two types of workers and prin-
cipals, namely sel￿sh (l) and (conditionally) altruistic (h) types. A sel￿sh
or egoistic principal has no altruistic feelings at all: ￿l = 0. An altruistic
principal￿ s care for the worker is denoted ￿h 2 (0;1). The prior probabil-
ity that the principal is sel￿sh is given by ￿. Because the principal￿ s type
is unobservable, a worker￿ s altruism depends on his beliefs concerning the
principal￿ s type. Workers update their beliefs after observing the principal￿ s
5This standard transformation is only correct when there is no uncertainty on the prin-
cipal￿ s type, either because types are observable or because the worker puts all probability
mass on a certain type. Uncertainty on the principal￿ s type reduces the worker￿ s welfare
compared to the utility suggested by (2). Because, as we shall see, only separating equi-
libria exist, there is no uncertainty on the principal￿ s type in equilibrium, and hence it is
safe to ignore the worker￿ s ￿ preference for certainty￿in this domain for simplicity. Taking
this preference into account would only strengthen the results, because deviation from the
equilibrium strategy is less attractive when it leads to uncertainty about the principal￿ s
type.
6This assumption does not a⁄ect the main results. The mathematical condition is
derived in the proof of lemma 4 given in the appendix.
7Obviously, the coe¢ cients ￿j and ￿i(￿j) depend on the units in which utility is mea-
sured, because utility must be measured in interpersonally comparable units. Therefore,
the principal￿ s payo⁄ function only makes sense when the worker￿ s utility is measured by
the transformed utility function (2). Note that both players take the other￿ s total payo⁄
into account, so including the immaterialistic part of the payo⁄function. This assumption
is not essential for the qualitative results and is not uncommon in the literature, see e.g.
Becker (1974), Barro (1974), Bernheim and Stark (1988), Ley (1997), Sol (2010) and Dur
and Sol (2010). Con￿ning altruism to the material payo⁄s, as in Levine (1998), leads
to a discrepancy between the worker￿ s actual utility and what the principal believes the
worker￿ s utility to be. This is inconvenient analytically.
8contract choice using Bayes￿rule. When applicable, I rule out unreasonable
beliefs by requiring that beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion.8
Workers are either egoistic or conditionally altruistic/reciprocal. Speci￿-
cally, I assume that an egoistic worker type never takes the principal￿ s welfare
into account regardless of the principal￿ s altruism (￿l(￿j) = 0 for any ￿j) and
that a reciprocal worker type is completely egoistic when he believes that the
principal is sel￿sh (￿h(￿l) = 0). Thus, only a conditionally altruistic worker
who believes that he is employed by an altruistic principal takes the welfare
of the principal into account, i.e. ￿h(￿h) > 0. I assume that a fraction ￿ of
all workers in the population is sel￿sh, whereas the remaining fraction (1￿￿)
is conditionally altruistic.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal decides on a
remuneration scheme (b;s). A worker accepts the contract if it yields him an
expected utility of at least his reservation utility u. Hence, as is common in
principal-agent models, workers have no bargaining power. Also, I assume
that u does not depend on ￿i(￿j): the value of a worker￿ s outside option does
not depend on his type. In case none of the workers accepts the contract, the
principal￿ s payo⁄ is zero. Finally, the employed worker decides on his e⁄ort
level e.
4 Analysis when types are observable
In this section, I assume that both players learn about each other￿ s type
before they make any decision. The reason for studying this case is that it
yields some insights that will be valuable later on. I solve for a subgame
perfect equilibrium using backward induction. The worker￿ s e⁄ort choice fol-
lows from maximization of his utility function (2). The ￿rst-order condition
is described by:
b ￿ ￿e + ￿i(￿j)(1 ￿ b) = 0: (4)
It is instructive to see what happens if b = 0 or if b = 1. If b = 0, the
worker only exerts e⁄ort out of an altruism motive. By contrast, if the
worker is residual claimant (b = 1), the worker￿ s actions do not a⁄ect the
principal￿ s pro￿ts. Therefore, any worker type equates the marginal costs
of e⁄ort with the marginal product (￿e = 1), independent of his altruistic
feelings. Rewriting the ￿rst-order condition (4) gives the worker￿ s optimal
8Beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion if, for all out-of-equilibrium actions, zero proba-
bility is assigned to player types that can only lose compared to their equilibrium payo⁄,






b + ￿i(￿j)(1 ￿ b)
￿
. (5)
It can easily be seen that e⁄ort increases in ￿nancial incentives for any b
and in the worker￿ s altruism as long as b < 1. Also, it is easily veri￿ed
that altruism reduces the motivational e⁄ect of ￿nancial incentives (de
db) and
vice versa: ￿nancial incentives reduce the responsiveness of e⁄ort towards
altruism (de
d￿). The latter e⁄ect is intuitive: the larger the share of the mar-
ginal product that accrues to the worker, the smaller the share that accrues
to the principal, hence the smaller the worker￿ s possibilities to increase the
principal￿ s welfare. Therefore, the model predicts partial crowding-out of
voluntary cooperation.9 The negative e⁄ect of altruism on the motivational
e⁄ect of ￿nancial incentives follows from the fact that the more the worker
cares for his boss, the less he enjoys his bonus. In the extreme case that
￿i(￿j) approaches 1, the worker cannot be motivated by incentive pay be-
cause he cares about the principal￿ s payo⁄as much as he cares about his own
payo⁄.
The principal￿ s choice of the optimal bonus b follows from maximization
of his expected payo⁄, where he takes into account the worker￿ s response to
￿nancial incentives and the worker￿ s participation constraint:
max
s;b
E(￿j) = (1 ￿ b)e
￿
i ￿ s + ￿jE(ui)
s.t. E(ui) = be
￿










2 + ￿i(￿j)E(￿j) ￿ u:
Since the principal cares more about his own payo⁄ than about the worker￿ s
utility (0 ￿ ￿j < 1), it is not optimal to leave a rent to the worker. The prin-
cipal thus reduces the base salary until the participation constraint binds.
Inserting the base salary implied by the participation constraint into the ob-
jective function and di⁄erentiating with respect to b, we obtain the following








This condition elucidates the principal￿ s trade-o⁄. An increase in the bonus
has one bene￿t and two costs. The bene￿t is that an increase in the bonus
leads to additional e⁄ort, which contributes to the principal￿ s payo⁄with the
9Voluntary cooperation is de￿ned as the di⁄erence between actual e⁄ort (e￿
i) and pri-
vately optimal e⁄ort ( b
￿). Clearly,
￿i(￿j)(1￿b)
￿ is decreasing in the bonus. Note that similar
expressions can be found in Arbak and Kranich (2005) and Sliwka (2007).
10size of the marginal product. However, because the worker￿ s participation
constraint is binding, the worker needs to be compensated for the additional
cost of providing e⁄ort. Moreover, risk-averse workers need to be compen-
sated for exposure to income uncertainty. We derive the payo⁄-maximizing







2 + ￿r￿2: (6)
Clearly, the bonus decreases in the worker￿ s altruism ￿i(￿j). The reason is
twofold. First, the more altruistic the worker, the smaller the motivational




creases in ￿i(￿j), hence reducing the marginal bene￿t of the bonus. The
second reason is that the more altruistic the worker, the more e⁄ort he ex-
erts, and consequently the higher his marginal costs of e⁄ort. Because the
worker needs to be compensated for his costs of e⁄ort, it is more costly to
stimulate e⁄ort further using ￿nancial incentives. Note that when the worker
has no altruistic feelings towards his principal (￿i(￿j) = 0), we obtain the
standard solution: the bonus is decreasing in the worker￿ s risk aversion and
in the variance of the error term.
A result that is harder to anticipate is the ambiguous total e⁄ect of an
increase in ￿i(￿j) on e⁄ort. Given the level of ￿nancial incentives, worker￿ s
altruism has a positive e⁄ect on e⁄ort, but this is possibly more than o⁄set














2 + ￿r￿2￿2 ,
which is positive if ￿r￿2 > [1 ￿ ￿i(￿j)]
2. Thus, an increase in ￿i(￿j) only
has a positive e⁄ect on e⁄ort when workers are relatively risk-averse. Strong
risk-aversion implies that the bonus is relatively small (b￿ < 1
2). As a result,
additional e⁄ort has a relatively large e⁄ect on the principal￿ s welfare, and
hence the worker￿ s e⁄ort is more responsive to changes in ￿i(￿j). By contrast,
when workers are hardly risk-averse, the bonus is close to the marginal prod-
uct, which restricts the worker￿ s opportunities to bene￿t the principal. The
negative e⁄ect of a reduction in incentives therefore outweights the positive
e⁄ect of an increase in worker￿ s altruism.
The base salary is such that the worker￿ s participation constraint is ex-
actly satis￿ed:













￿2 ￿ ￿i(￿j)E(￿j): (7)
11As long as the principal￿ s expected payo⁄is positive10, total compensation is
decreasing in the worker￿ s altruism. The main reason is a compensating wage
di⁄erential: the more utility workers derive from the non-monetary aspects
of their job, the lower the required monetary compensation. Altruism leads
to a rent that can be extracted when types are observable. A second reason
is that the strength of ￿nancial incentives decreases in the worker￿ s altruism,
which is re￿ ected in a lower risk-premium when workers are risk averse.
Worker￿ s altruism has a positive e⁄ect on pro￿ts, for two reasons. First,
because preferences are more aligned, altruistic workers are willing to exert
more e⁄ort, given the strength of ￿nancial incentives (see (5)). Second, as
more altruistic workers derive more utility from the non-monetary aspects of
their job, they are willing to accept a lower base salary, keeping b constant
(see (7)).
5 Analysis when types are unobservable
In the previous section we obtained some basic insights by assuming that
types are observable. In this section I study the more interesting case where
types are private information. Because neither the worker￿ s type nor the
principal￿ s type is observable, contracts potentially have a dual role of both
signaling the principal￿ s type and screening worker￿ s types. I consider four
possible Perfect Bayesian equilibria, namely pooling and separating equilib-
ria, where in each equilibrium the principal either screens or abstains from
screening. In pooling equilibria, the equilibrium contract o⁄er is independent
of the principal￿ s type. By contrast, in separating equilibria di⁄erent types
o⁄er di⁄erent contracts.
In the next two subsections, I will show that pooling equilibria do not
exist. Then, I analyze a fully separating equilibrium where the principal
signals his altruism, but abstains from screening worker types. Finally, I
study a fully separating equilibrium where the altruistic principal writes a
contract that signals his altruism and simultaneously screens worker types. I
abstract from mixed strategy equilibria. Hence, throughout I refer to a fully
separating equilibrium simply as separating equilibrium.
10Firms can only stay in business as long as expected pro￿ts are at least zero. It is
easily veri￿ed that pro￿ts are increasing in the worker￿ s altruism, so an altruistic principal
obtains a positive expected payo⁄ even when an egoistic principal earns zero pro￿ts in
expectation.
125.1 Analysis: Pooling equilibrium
This section studies existence of a pooling equilibrium where the principal
does not screen workers. I start the analysis by noting that any equilibrium
contract, pooling or separating, has to satisfy four constraints. The ￿rst
two constraints consist of each principal￿ s incentive compatibility constraint
(ICC): neither of the types should have an incentive to deviate. The other
two constraints are the participation contraints (PC) of both worker types. In
equilibria where principals do not screen workers, both worker types should
be willing to accept the equilibrium contract(s). By contrast, screening of
workers￿types requires that the equilibrium contract is acceptable for con-
ditionally altruistic workers only. In equilibrium, workers￿beliefs should be
correct. Thus, in a pooling equilibrium, workers believe that the principal is
egoistic with probability ￿.
In order to show that a pooling equilibrium does not exist, it is instruc-
tive to compare the pro￿t functions of the egoistic and altruistic principal,
see equation (3). The crucial di⁄erence between the two types is that the
altruistic principal enjoys the expected utility of the worker, in addition to
his monetary payo⁄. Whether a deviation from the equilibrium contract is
pro￿table depends to a large extent on reciprocal workers￿out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. When reciprocal workers interpret deviation as a signal that the prin-
cipal is egoistic, deviation is not pro￿table for both types of principals. By
contrast, if deviation is interpreted as a signal of altruism, both types are
willing to deviate.
The intuitive criterion, however, restricts the set of possible out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. In particular, it rules out that the worker believes that a deviation
comes from an egoistic principal when that deviation cannot be pro￿table
for an egoist, while an altruist gains by such a deviation. Such a contract
always exists. For instance, the altruistic principal can deviate by increasing
the base salary with an amount equal to the additional revenues he gains
when the worker believes with probability one that the contract is o⁄ered
by an altruist. The egoist can only lose by o⁄ering such a contract. The
altruistic principal, however, gains by o⁄ering such a contract, because his
monetary payo⁄ is una⁄ected, while at the same time the worker obtains a
strictly higher utility, which is valuable for an altruist. Thus, the intuitive
criterion dictates that such a deviation must come from an altruistic princi-
pal, implying that the altruistic principal always has an incentive to deviate.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion above:
Proposition 1 A pooling equilibrium where the principal does not screen
workers, does not exist.
135.2 Analysis: Pooling and screening equilibrium
Instead of pooling on a contract that is acceptable for both types of workers,
principals may also pool on a contract that is acceptable for conditionally
altruistic workers only. As noted above, screening requires that an egoistic
worker￿ s participation constraint is violated, while at the same time satis-
fying the other constraints. The worker￿ s utility function (2) reveals that a
reciprocal worker derives more utility from a given contract than a sel￿sh
worker, as long as he believes with positive probability that the principal is
an altruist. Thus, the principal can screen workers by extracting (part of)
reciprocal workers￿rent. The possibility to screen workers, however, does not
change the altruistic principal￿ s incentive to break the proposed equilibrium:
Proposition 2 A pooling equilibrium where the principal screens workers
does not exist.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is the same as in a pooling equilibrium where the principal
does not screen workers: the altruistic principal always ￿nds it pro￿table to
reveal his type. He deviates by o⁄ering a contract that cannot be pro￿tably
o⁄ered by an egoistic principal, and by the intuitive criterion, such a devia-
tion must be interpreted as a credible signal of his altruism. The altruistic
principal enjoys the resulting increase in worker￿ s utility, while earning the
same (or slightly lower) monetary pro￿ts. A formal proof is provided in the
appendix, as the proof is complicated by the screening constraint outlined
above.
5.3 Analysis: Separating equilibria
This section studies separating equilibria: equilibria where the altruistic prin-
cipal o⁄ers a contract that signals his altruism. As pointed out above, in a
separating equilibrium the principal either screens or refrains from screening
workers. I will distinguish between the two cases after laying out the common
structure of these equilibria.
I start the analysis by deriving the egoistic principal￿ s contract choice.
Using the assumption that a sel￿sh principal does not care about worker￿ s
utility, his expected payo⁄ (see equation (3)) can be written as:
E(￿l) = (1 ￿ bl)[￿ell + (1 ￿ ￿)ehl] ￿ sl; (8)
where the subscript (l) is used to indicate that the remuneration scheme
(bl;sl) is o⁄ered by a sel￿sh principal. Similarly, eij denotes the e⁄ort of
14a worker of type i who faces the incentive scheme o⁄ered by a principal of
type j and consequently believes that he is employed by a principal of type
j.11 His e⁄ort choice is described by equation (5). Because beliefs should
be correct in equilibrium, a worker of type i observing the contract (bl;sl)
correctly believes that he is employed by a sel￿sh principal, implying that
his expected utility (2) is described by:











l + ￿i(￿l)E(￿l) ￿ u: (9)
Clearly, because ￿i(￿l) = 0 irrespective of a worker￿ s type, both worker types
exert the same e⁄ort and derive the same utility from accepting the sel￿sh
principal￿ s equilibrium contract. This implies that both types require the
same compensation to satisfy their participation constraint. Because in any
separating equilibrium a sel￿sh principal has no reason to screen or to signal
his type, he does not distort his optimal contract choice compared to the
case when types are observable. Thus, the following lemma applies:
Lemma 1 In any separating equilibrium, the egoistic principal o⁄ers a bonus
bl = 1
1+r￿2￿ and a base salary that exactly satis￿es the worker￿ s participation
constraint:












Proof. To show that in any separating equilibrium the egoistic principal
always ￿nds it optimal to o⁄er the contract speci￿ed above, ￿rst note that in
any separating equilibrium screening makes no sense for the egoistic principal
and is not even possible, as ￿i(￿l) = 0 (see (9)). Thus, all possible equilib-
rium contracts satisfy the worker￿ s PC as de￿ned by (9). To show that the
contract speci￿ed above is the unique equilibrium contract, consider any ar-
bitrary separating equilibrium. As worker￿ s beliefs are correct in equilibrium
(￿i(￿l) = 0), the sel￿sh principal cannot be confronted with a reduction in
worker￿ s altruism when deviating. Therefore, of all possible equilibrium con-
tracts, the egoistic principal will always choose the contract that maximizes
his expected payo⁄. The properties of this contract follow from the analysis
when types are observable and ￿i(￿l) = 0.
Although the egoistic principal￿ s equilibrium contract choice is highly in-
tuitive, it cannot be sustained for all out-of-equilibrium beliefs. For instance,
a reduction in the base salary should be viewed as coming from an egoistic
principal, otherwise the egoistic principal can gain by slightly reducing the
11Because in equilibrium beliefs are always based on the observed contract o⁄er, this
shorthand notation su¢ ces to describe the equilibrium contracts.
15base salary, hence selecting conditionally altruistic workers. It seems natural
to assume that a reduction in the base salary does not lead to more positive
beliefs. Similarly, a salary raise should not be regarded so optimistic that
the raise is actually pro￿table. Formally:
Lemma 2 In any separating equilibrium, the worker￿ s out-of-equilibrium be-
lief upon observing an alternative contract o⁄er (b0;s0), is de￿ned as follows.
Let E (￿￿
l) = E (￿l (bl;sl)) denote the egoistic principal￿ s expected payo⁄
in any separating equilibrium. Let pr(￿j = ￿h) denote the worker￿ s belief.
There are two cases:
1) When (b0;s0) is such that E (￿l (b0;s0) j pr(￿j = ￿h) = 1) ￿ E (￿￿
l), the
worker believes that pr(￿j = ￿h) = 1:
2) When (b0;s0) is such that E (￿l (b0;s0) j pr(￿j = ￿h) = 1) > E (￿￿
l), then
pr(￿j = ￿h) should be such that E (￿l (b0;s0) j pr(￿j = ￿h)) < E (￿￿
l). Such
a belief always exists.
Proof. The ￿rst condition directly follows from the requirement that beliefs
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. The second condition ensures that the egoistic
principal has no pro￿table deviation. To show that such a belief always exists,
notice that pr(￿j = ￿h) = 0 implies that E (￿l (b0;s0) j pr(￿j = ￿h) = 0) <
E (￿￿
l).
Deriving the altruistic principal￿ s equilibrium contract is more di¢ cult.
In a separating equilibrium, any contract that cannot be pro￿tably o⁄ered
by an egoistic principal is a possible equilibrium contract. However, it is
easily veri￿ed that the intuitive criterion rules out all equilibria in which the
altruistic principal o⁄ers a contract that does not maximize his expected pay-
o⁄.12 Therefore, of all possible equilibrium contracts, the altruistic principal
always chooses the contract that maximizes his expected payo⁄.
To derive this contract, it is instructive to inspect the altruistic principal￿ s
payo⁄ function. Assuming that the equilibrium contract (bh;sh) succeeds in
credibly signaling the principal￿ s altruism, rewriting equation (3) yields:
E(￿h) = (1￿bh)[￿elh + (1 ￿ ￿)ehh]￿sh+￿h [￿E(ul) + (1 ￿ ￿)E(uh)]: (11)
This equation shows that the altruistic principal￿ s payo⁄ positively depends
on a worker￿ s altruism for two reasons. First, as long as bh < 1, a reciprocal
worker will put more e⁄ort into his job than a sel￿sh worker (ehh > elh).
Second, a worker￿ s expected utility E(ui) increases in his altruism, which is
12The reason is that, since the equilibrium contract by de￿nition satis￿es the requirement
that it cannot pro￿tably be o⁄ered by an egoistic principal, the intuitive criterion dictates
that the contract must be o⁄ered by an altruistic principal.
16valuable for a principal who has altruistic feelings. For these two reasons,
the altruistic principal may bene￿t from writing a contract that convinces
reciprocal worker types that he is an altruist. In addition, he may ￿nd it
pro￿table to screen workers, which means that ￿ = 0. In order to credibly
signal altruism, the equilibrium contract (bh;sh) should satisfy two incentive
compatibility constraints: the sel￿sh principal should have no incentive to
mimic the altruist and vice versa:
(1 ￿ bl)e￿l ￿ sl ￿ (1 ￿ bh)e￿h ￿ sh; (ICC1)
(1￿bl)e￿l￿sl+￿hu ￿ (1￿bh)e￿h￿sh+￿h [￿E (ul) + (1 ￿ ￿)E (uh)]; (ICC2)
where e￿l = ￿ell + (1 ￿ ￿)ehl and e￿h = ￿elh + (1 ￿ ￿)ehh. The incentive
compatibility constraints in case the altruistic principal screens workers as-
sume that ￿ = 0 on the right hand side of the inequalities. It is essential to
note that when ICC1 is satis￿ed, ICC2 can only be satis￿ed if the di⁄erence
￿h [￿E (ul) + (1 ￿ ￿)E (uh)] ￿ ￿hu is large enough. This observation reveals
why in equilibrium a principal with altruistic feelings is willing to engage
in costly signaling: not because he earns a higher monetary payo⁄, but be-
cause he values workers￿utility. The altruistic principal￿ s monetary payo⁄is
constrained by the egoistic principal￿ s monetary payo⁄: an egoistic principal
will imitate any contract that yields a higher monetary payo⁄ than his own
equilibrium contract. Therefore, any positive di⁄erence in e⁄ort (e￿h ￿ e￿l)
must be re￿ ected in higher payments to the worker. Reasoning further along
these lines, the following lemma does not come as a surprise:
Lemma 3 The incentive compatibility constraint ICC1 is binding in any sep-
arating equilibrium, implying that ICC2 is slack.
Proof. Suppose, per absurdum, that ICC1 is slack. The altruistic princi-
pal chooses the contract that maximizes his payo⁄. Depending on whether
he screens or not, the contract satis￿es the participation constraint of both
workers or that of conditionally altruistic workers only. Since this contract
maximizes his payo⁄, ICC2 is satis￿ed, but ICC1 is violated. To see this,
recall that pro￿ts are increasing in the worker￿ s altruism, because more al-
truistic workers exert more e⁄ort (see (5)) and are willing to accept a lower
base salary (see (7)). Therefore, the egoistic principal ￿nds it pro￿table to
mimick the altruistic principal. Hence, ICC1 binds in any separating equi-
librium. Because any equilibrium contract satis￿es E(ui) ￿ u for the worker
who accepts the contract, ICC2 is slack when ICC1 holds with equality.
Since ICC1 is binding, in any separating equilibrium the optimal contract
will be a (bh;sh)￿combination such that ICC1 holds with equality and that
17ICC2 is slack.13 I will now proceed to discuss the separating equilibrium
where the principal does not screen.
5.3.1 Separating equilibrium: no screening
When the altruistic principal does not screen workers, his equilibrium con-
tract should satisfy the participation constraint (PC) of both worker types.
For ease of reference, the sel￿sh worker￿ s PC is described by











h ￿ u: (PCL)
Assuming that the contract (bh;sh) credibly signals the principal￿ s altruism,
a reciprocal worker￿ s PC is described by











h + ￿h(￿h)E(￿h) ￿ u: (PCH)
Comparison of these two constraints reveals that a reciprocal worker derives
more utility from a given equilibrium contract (bh;sh) than a sel￿sh worker.
This implies that when a sel￿sh worker￿ s PC is satis￿ed, a reciprocal worker￿ s
PC is also satis￿ed. Because the equilibrium contract (bh;sh) by assumption
satis￿es the sel￿sh worker￿ s PC, the reciprocal worker￿ s PC cannot be binding
in the proposed equilibrium.
The problem is to ￿nd the contract that maximizes the altruistic princi-
pal￿ s expected payo⁄, provided the four constraints outlined above are sat-
is￿ed. Because PCH and ICC2 are both slack, the problem can be reformu-
lated in a convenient way. As the altruistic principal￿ s monetary payo⁄ is
constrained by the pro￿ts earned by the egoistic principal, he maximizes his
total payo⁄by choosing a contract that exactly satis￿es ICC1 and maximizes
the expected utility of the worker. Denoting the egoistic principal￿ s equilib-
rium pro￿ts as E(￿￿






l) + ￿E (ul) + (1 ￿ ￿)E(uh)
s.t. sh = (1 ￿ bh)e￿h ￿ E(￿
￿
l); (ICC1)











h ￿ u: (PCL)
13Obviously, the altruistic principal should o⁄er a di⁄erent contract than the egoist, i.e.
the contract (bh = bl;sh = sl) is not feasible. As we shall see, this condition is always
satis￿ed if r￿2 > 0.
18Intuitively, a reasonable conjecture is that maximization of worker￿ s utility
ensures that the sel￿sh worker￿ s PC is satis￿ed. For ease of exposition, I
assume that PCL is satis￿ed and show afterwards that this conjecture is
correct. This allows me to rewrite the problem by substituting E (ul), E(uh),
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The ￿rst-order condition is the same as in the observable types case, but
weighted according to the prevalence of the two worker types. An altruistic
principal thus o⁄ers the bonus that maximizes the expected surplus. There-
fore, depending on the fraction of sel￿sh workers in the population (￿), the
payo⁄-maximizing bonus bh lies between b￿ =
[1￿￿h(￿h)]2
[1￿￿h(￿h)]2+￿r￿2 and bl = 1
1+￿r￿2,
implying that an altruistic principal o⁄ers a lower bonus than a sel￿sh prin-
cipal. This can also be seen after rewriting the ￿rst-order condition:
bh =
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿h(￿h)]
2
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿h(￿h)]
2 + ￿r￿2:
The ￿nding that bh < bl implies that an altruistic principal pays a higher
base salary than an egoistic principal. Recall the assumption made earlier
that r￿2￿ ￿ 1 , implying that PCL requires that a reduction in the bonus is
compensated by a higher base salary. Thus, as long as PCL is satis￿ed, an
altruistic principal always pays a higher base salary than an egoistic principal.
The analysis thus leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3 In a separating equilibrium where the principal does not screen
workers, an altruistic principal o⁄ers weaker ￿nancial incentives and pays a
higher base salary than an egoistic principal.
Given that the altruistic principal chooses the bonus that maximizes the
expected surplus, how does he ensure that an egoistic principal is not willing
to imitate him? This is the role of the base salary: the altruist increases the
base salary up to the point that the sel￿sh principal is not any longer willing
to mimic him.
19However, this does not imply that the altruistic principal pays a higher
expected total compensation than his egoistic counterpart. The altruistic
principal only pays a higher expected total compensation when workers pro-
vide more e⁄ort on average. To see this, it is convenient to use the fact that
ICC1 is binding in equilibrium. Rewriting ICC1 gives:
bhe￿h + sh = ble￿l + sl + e￿h ￿ e￿l
Clearly, whether expected total compensation paid by the altruistic princi-
pal exceeds that of the sel￿sh principal depends on the di⁄erence in average
e⁄ort e￿h ￿e￿l. When the altruistic principal￿ s equilibrium contract does not
induce workers to provide more e⁄ort on average, credibly signaling altruism
does not require paying a higher expected total compensation. As shown
in the observable types case, conditionally altruistic workers do not always
exert more e⁄ort when employed by an altruistic principal, because an al-
truistic principal sets weaker ￿nancial incentives, i.e. bh < bl. Therefore, we
cannot be sure that a reciprocal worker exerts more e⁄ort when employed
by an altruistic principal, whereas a sel￿sh worker unambiguously provides
less e⁄ort. Whether the altruistic principal pays a higher expected total
compensation than an egoistic principal thus depends on the parameters.
Proposition 4 The altruistic principal pays a higher expected total compen-
sation than the egoist if and only if ￿h(￿h) + r￿￿2 > 1.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition behind this condition is that the di⁄erence in average e⁄ort
e￿h ￿ e￿l is only positive when the productivity of a conditionally altruis-
tic worker su¢ ciently exceeds the productivity of an egoistic worker, either
because a conditionally altruistic worker cares a lot about the principal￿ s
welfare or because it is costly to motivate the worker via ￿nancial incentives.
So, combining propositions 3 and 4, paying a relatively low expected total
compensation does not necessarily disprove a principal￿ s altruism as long as
it is accompanied by weak ￿nancial incentives.
The equilibrium is illustrated by ￿gure 1. The ￿gure shows ICC1 for
￿h(￿h) < 1
2 and the participation constraints PCL and PCH. Thus, ICC1
represents an isopro￿t curve that for each bonus indicates the minimum base
salary required to keep the sel￿sh principal from imitating.14 Similarly, PCL
and PCH are indi⁄erence curves indicating the lowest base salary that is
14Speci￿cally, ICC1 represents the isopro￿t curve of the egoistic principal who imitates
the altruist. This is identical to the material part of the altruistic principal￿ s isopayo⁄
curve.
20acceptable to a sel￿sh and reciprocal worker, respectively. The arrows thus
demonstrate the area of feasible contracts. The dotted line represents an in-
di⁄erence curve of a hypothetical ￿ average￿worker. That is, it is a weighted
average of both worker types￿indi⁄erence curves representing the utility lev-
els they obtain in the optimum. The optimum is where the indi⁄erence curve
of the hypothetical ￿ average￿worker is tangent to ICC1. The corresponding
bonus (bh) maximizes the expected surplus.
For the remainder of the paper, it is important to understand the intuition
behind the curves. The slope of ICC1 depends on ￿h(￿h):
Lemma 4 Let sICC1
h denote the base salary that keeps the egoist from imi-
tating, as de￿ned by ICC1. sICC1
h is always decreasing in the bonus provided
(1 ￿ ￿)￿h(￿h) > 1
2, but has an inverted u-shape when (1 ￿ ￿)￿h(￿h) < 1
2.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is that ICC1 consists of two e⁄ects. On the one hand,
worker￿ s e⁄ort is increasing in the bonus, requiring an increase in the base
salary to keep the sel￿sh principal from mimicking. On the other hand, an
increase in the bonus reduces the share of the marginal product that accrues
to the principal, allowing for a decrease in the base salary. Since highly
reciprocal workers exert relatively high e⁄ort and are relatively insensitive to
incentive pay, the latter e⁄ect dominates when (1 ￿ ￿)￿h(￿h) > 1
2.
Both PCL and PCH slope downwards, as depicted in ￿gure 1. The reason
is that an increase in the expected bonus payment bene￿ts the worker, im-
plying that the base salary should decrease to keep expected utility constant.
This e⁄ect is partially o⁄set by an increase in the worker￿ s exposure to risk.15
The reciprocal worker￿ s PC, PCH, is always below PCL, which follows from
the fact that a reciprocal worker derives more utility from the same equi-
librium contract than an egoist. Moreover, PCH has a steeper slope than
PCL:
Lemma 5 Let sPCL
h and sPCH
h denote the base salary such that PCL and
PCH are exactly satis￿ed. sPCL
h and sPCH










The reason is that a conditionally altruistic worker exerts more e⁄ort than
an egoist for a given bonus, implying that an increase in the bonus leads to
15This is by assumption, as I imposed that r￿2￿ ￿ 1 to ensure that indi⁄erence curves
are downward sloping.
21a larger increase in expected payments for a conditionally altruistic worker
than for an egoistic worker. Therefore, a reciprocal worker permits a larger
decrease in the base salary while keeping expected utility at the same level.
Two important observations need to be made. The ￿rst is that there is
always a point on PCL that represents the contract o⁄ered by the sel￿sh
principal, namely (bl;sl). Since PCL is the sel￿sh worker￿ s indi⁄erence curve
yielding his reservation utility E(ul) = u, the contract (bl;sl) is necessarily a
point on PCL, as depicted in ￿gures 1 and 2. The second observation is that
when the altruistic principal o⁄ers bh equal to bl, ICC1 requires that sh > sl.
The reason is that all contracts on ICC1 are assumed to succeed in signaling
(and screening in the next section). Since for a given bonus expected e⁄ort
is higher when the principal is believed to be an altruist, it must be that for
bh = bl, sh > sl to discourage the egoistic principal from imitating.
Finally, recall that I still have to show that the equilibrium contract
(bh;sh) satis￿es PCL. As argued above, the altruistic principal maximizes
the utility of a hypothetical ￿ average worker￿ , as workers are egoistic with
probability ￿. By lemma 5, the indi⁄erence curves of the ￿ average￿worker
are steeper than those of the egoist. Suppose that the altruistic principal
chooses bh = bl and sh > sl to discourage the egoistic principal from imitat-
ing. This contract ensures that the egoistic worker￿ s participation constraint
is satis￿ed. Suppose that the altruistic principal chooses a contract (bh;sh),
where bh < bl, on the ￿ average￿worker￿ s indi⁄erence curve that intersects this
contract. As the average indi⁄erence curve is steeper than PCL, the sel￿sh
worker gains from a decrease in the bonus (bh < bl) and a corresponding
raise in the base salary that keeps the utility of the ￿ average￿worker un-
changed. Thus, the equilibrium contract ensures that the egoistic worker￿ s
participation constraint is satis￿ed.
22Figure 1: separating equilibrium without screening
5.3.2 Separating equilibrium: screening
This section studies a separating equilibrium where the altruistic principal
writes a contract that signals his altruism and simultaneously screens worker
types. First, consider the egoistic principal￿ s contract choice. Because all
workers behave completely egoistic when they believe that the principal is
sel￿sh (i.e. ￿i(￿l) = 0), a sel￿sh principal has no signaling or screening
motive in equilibrium. Thus, as derived formally in lemma 1, the sel￿sh
principal o⁄ers a bonus bl = 1
1+r￿2￿ and the lowest base salary workers are
willing to accept.
The altruistic principal may bene￿t from writing a contract that selects
reciprocal workers only. As noted earlier, the altruistic principal￿ s utility is
increasing in the fraction of reciprocal workers, provided he convinces them
that he is an altruist. Screening of worker types requires that the contract
(bh;sh) simultaneously violates PCL and satis￿es PCH. For ease of exposi-
23tion, I refer to violating PCL as satisfying the screening constraint (SCC):











h ￿ u: (SCC)
The proposed equilibrium contract should not only screen worker types,
but also signal the principal￿ s altruism. Thus, the contract should satisfy
the two incentive compatibility constraints. Assuming that SCC and PCH
are satis￿ed, the incentive compatibility constraints ICC1 and ICC2 can be
written as:
(1 ￿ bl)e￿l ￿ sl ￿ (1 ￿ bh)ehh ￿ sh (ICC1￿ )
(1 ￿ bl)e￿l ￿ sl + ￿hu ￿ (1 ￿ bh)ehh ￿ sh + ￿hE(uh) (ICC2￿ )
Since ICC1￿and ICC2￿are nothing but special cases of ICC1 and ICC2,
the same reasoning applies to show that ICC1￿is always binding and hence
ICC2￿is slack. Because pro￿ts are increasing in the worker￿ s altruism, a
sel￿sh principal is always willing to imitate an altruistic principal, unless the
altruistic principal explicitly takes ICC1￿into account, see lemma 3 for a
formal proof. Moreover, we observed in the previous section that when the
principal abstains from screening workers, PCL is always satis￿ed. Therefore,
succesful screening requires that the principal takes SCC into account, in
other words SCC is binding as well. This also proves that the reciprocal
worker￿ s PC is satis￿ed, because when SCC is binding, PCH is slack. Thus,
the altruistic principal￿ s contract o⁄er can be characterized as follows:
Lemma 6 In a separating and screening equilibrium, the altruistic principal
o⁄ers a contract such that ICC1￿and SCC hold with equality. Such a contract
always exists for bh 2 (bl;1).
Proof. See appendix.
Figure 2 illustrates the altruistic principal￿ s maximization problem. The
similarity with ￿gure 1 should be clear: it shows ICC1￿ , SCC and PCH. Re-
call that the altruistic principal chooses the point on ICC1￿that maximizes
the reciprocal worker￿ s expected utility. By shifting the conditionally altru-
istic worker￿ s indi⁄erence curve (PCH) up along ICC1￿ , it can easily be seen
that, given the screening constraint, his expected utility is maximized at an
intersection of ICC1￿and SCC.
24Figure 2: separating equilibrium where the altruistic principal screens
Figure 2 provides an intuitive explanation of lemma 6. Recall that for
bh = bl, ICC1￿lies above SCC. When bh = 1, ICC1￿is always below SCC,
and hence an intersection point on the interval (bl;1) always exists. There is
a clear intuition for this fact. When bh = 1, the worker is the full residual
claimant and SCC thus speci￿es the maximum amount he is willing to pay
for the ￿rm. This amount is equal to the expected revenues minus the costs
of e⁄ort, risk-bearing and the outside option. Similarly, when bh = 1, ICC1￿
speci￿es the maximum amount an altruistic principal can receive for the
￿rm: this amount should not exceed the pro￿ts made by the sel￿sh principal.
The sel￿sh principal￿ s pro￿ts are given by the expected revenues minus the
compensation for the worker￿ s e⁄ort, risk and outside option. The amount
the worker is willing to pay for the ￿rm (SCC) is always smaller than the
equilibrium pro￿ts made by the sel￿sh principal (ICC1￿ ), because the sel￿sh
principal sets the bonus at the surplus-maximizing level (bl < 1). By contrast,
when the altruistic principal makes the worker full residual claimant (bh = 1),
he exposes the worker to an ine¢ cient amount of risk, which reduces his
willingness to pay for ownership of the ￿rm. When expressed as a base
25salary, SCC thus always exceeds ICC1￿ , implying that an intersection point
on the interval (bl;1) always exists.
However, as illustrated by ￿gure 2, when ￿h(￿h) is small, ICC1￿has an
inverted u-shape, implying that there are two intersection points.16 In that
case, the principal prefers the bonus at the intersection point on the interval
(bl;1). To see this, recall that the altruistic principal chooses the point on
ICC1￿that maximizes the reciprocal worker￿ s expected utility. By shifting
the conditionally altruistic worker￿ s indi⁄erence curve (PCH) up along ICC1￿ ,
it can easily be seen that, given the constraints, the principal prefers the
intersection point that speci￿es the highest bonus. The reason is that an
increase in the bonus is more bene￿cial for a reciprocal worker than an egoistic
worker due to the former￿ s higher e⁄ort.
Proposition 5 In a separating and screening equilibrium, the altruistic prin-
cipal o⁄ers stronger incentives and pays a lower base salary than the egoistic
principal, i.e. bh 2 (bl;1) and sh < sl.
Proof. See appendix.
In contrast to the previous section, the altruistic principal pays a lower
base salary than the egoistic principal. As illustrated by ￿gure 2, the down-
ward sloping participation constraint of the egoistic worker implies that, as
this constraint is binding, a higher bonus is re￿ ected in a lower base salary.
Nevertheless, the expected total compensation earned/paid by the altruistic
worker/principal is always larger than that of the sel￿sh type.17 The reason
is that because a reciprocal worker faces stronger incentives than a sel￿sh
worker, he unambiguously provides more e⁄ort (ehh > e￿l), implying that an
altruistic principal has to pay more than a sel￿sh principal to discourage him
from imitating. This result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6 In a separating and screening equilibrium, an altruistic prin-
cipal pays a higher expected total compensation than an egoistic principal.
These results stand in remarkable contrast with the results in the previous
section. The reason for these diverging ￿ndings is that screening can (most
16A second intersection point may also exist when ￿h(￿h) is su¢ ciently high and bh > 1.
I assume that b ￿ 1, but it can be shown that the intersection point on the interval (bl;1)
is strictly preferred.
17As in the previous section, this can be seen from rewriting ICC1￿ :
bhehh + sh = ble￿l + sl + ehh ￿ e￿l;
implying that bhehh + sh > ble￿l + sl, since ehh > e￿l.
26e¢ ciently) be accomplished by o⁄ering stronger incentives than otherwise
optimal. These excessively strong incentives reduce the total surplus and
diminish the attractiveness of the contract for the sel￿sh worker, which is
inevitable in order to satisfy both the screening constraint and ICC1￿ .
5.3.3 Comparison of equilibria
One may wonder whether the altruistic principal prefers the separating and
screening equilibrium above the standard separating equilibrium. This ques-
tion is particularly relevant, because the altruistic principal can always de-
viate to the equilibrium that gives him the largest total expected payo⁄. As
argued above, as long as ICC1 or ICC1￿are satis￿ed, the intuitive crite-
rion implies that deviation must come from an altruistic principal. Thus the
equilibrium that yields the altruistic principal the highest payo⁄ will be the
unique equilibrium outcome.
Because the altruistic principal￿ s pro￿ts are identical in the two situations
(namely the same as the sel￿sh principal￿ s payo⁄ E (￿￿
l)), the equilibrium
that yields the highest expected worker utility is preferred. Screening of
worker types has the advantage that only conditionally altruistic workers
are attracted, which has a positive e⁄ect on expected worker utility. First,
because conditionally altruistic workers exert more e⁄ort, which is re￿ ected in
a higher salary. Second, because conditionally altruistic workers derive utility
from the principal￿ s welfare. However, screening is also costly: the bonus
is distorted compared to the e¢ cient bonus level. The higher ￿h(￿h), the
larger the distortion. Thus, incurring the costs of screening is unattractive
when ￿h(￿h) is relatively large and when the large majority of workers is
conditionally altruistic:
Proposition 7 A separating and screening equilibrium always exists for small




I have studied the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentives
by incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model.
The speci￿cation of reciprocity is taken from Levine (1998), and allows to
distinguish between authentic and strategic kindness. The key assumption
is that some workers care more for the principal when they are convinced
27that the principal cares for them. The principal can be egoistic or altruistic.
An altruistic principal can signal his type by o⁄ering a generous contract,
consisting of a base salary and a piece rate. As is common in principal-agent
models, the worker is risk-averse and not constrained by limited-liability.
Inspired by the ￿ndings in several experiments, I have allowed for worker
heterogeneity by assuming that not all workers are reciprocal. As a result,
the principal may ￿nd it attractive to screen workers.
Assuming that types are private information, I have found that an altru-
istic principal who abstains from screening, signals his altruism by o⁄ering
relatively weak incentives and a relatively high base salary. The piece rate
and the base salary simultaneously convince the worker of the principal￿ s care.
The reason for o⁄ering weak incentives is that when workers are convinced
of the principal￿ s care, strong incentives add little to worker￿ s productivity,
while exposing workers to unnecessary risk. O⁄ering strong incentives is
therefore suboptimal for a principal who cares about the worker￿ s well-being.
The second ￿nding is that to induce reciprocity, an altruistic principal
does not necessarily have to pay a higher expected total compensation than
an egoistic principal. As part of the altruistic principal￿ s gift is a reduction
in incentives, the worker￿ s expected e⁄ort may be relatively low, despite his
altruistic feelings. Therefore, an egoistic principal has no reason to mimic
the altruist, implying that a relatively low expected total compensation may
su¢ ce to distinguish both types. An altruistic principal only pays a higher
expected total compensation when signaling altruism leads to signi￿cant pro-
ductivity gains.
Finally, as some workers do not reciprocate the principal￿ s altruism, the
principal may ￿nd it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously signals
his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I have shown that such
a contract is characterised by excessively strong incentives and a relatively
high expected total compensation. Incentives are a suitable instrument for
screening workers, because conditionally altruistic workers put in more e⁄ort
than egoistic workers and hence gain more from output-contingent pay. Thus,
strong incentives are o⁄ered to attract the worker who needs them the least.
Of course, there are some limitations to the analysis. A ￿rst limitation is
that I only looked at monetary rewards, while employers typically have other
instruments to stimulate or control workers, such as work rules, work or-
ganisation, minimum e⁄ort requirements, task assignment or giving personal
attention to workers. All of these may be helpful to signal the employer￿ s
benevolent intentions. Therefore, it may well be that employers that estab-
lish good relationships with their workers via these non-monetary means can
a⁄ord paying lower wages, as in Dur (2009) and Dur et al. (2010). This
would be well in line with the results of the observable types case.
28Relatedly, a second limitation is that in large organizations wages are
not always determined by the relevant managers, and the interpretation as a
gift may therefore be problematic. It would be interesting to see how wage-
setting institutions and organizational structure impact on the prospects for
gift-exchange.
A third limitation is that the model I presented is a partial equilibrium
model: there is no competition between employers and the outside option
of both worker types is exogenously given. It is not ex-ante clear to what
extent the results carry over to a general equilibrium setting. Thus, there is
ample room for further research, both theoretically and empirically.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of proposition 2
The proof builds on the analysis of the separating equilibria. Screening re-
quires that the egoistic worker￿ s participation constraint (PCL) is violated,
while at the same time the conditionally altruistic worker￿ s participation con-
straint is satis￿ed. All contracts that satisfy these two conditions are possible
equilibrium candidates, depending on the out-of-equilibrium beliefs. I show
that none of these contracts, denoted (bp;sp), is an equilibrium contract, as
there is always a pro￿table deviation.
First, we can rule out all pooling contracts that yield the egoistic principal
lower expected pro￿ts than he earns in a separating equilibrium, E (￿￿
l). The
egoistic principal can always pro￿tably deviate by o⁄ering the separating
equilibrium contract (bl;sl), which ensures him at least E (￿￿
l), irrespective
of the worker￿ s out-of-equilibrium beliefs.
To rule out all pooling contracts (bp;sp) that yield higher pro￿ts than
E (￿￿
l), we proceed along the lines suggested in the main text. We look for
an alternative contract o⁄er (b0;s0) that can be pro￿table for an altruistic
principal, but not for an egoist. The reason is that for such a deviation, the
Intuitive Criterion uniquely de￿nes the out-of-equilibrium beliefs, namely
that pr(￿j = ￿h) = 1. More formally, the contract (b0;s0) breaks the equi-
librium if the following conditions are satis￿ed:
1. The expected monetary payo⁄with the most optimistic beliefs possible
is equal to the monetary payo⁄ in equilibrium.
2. A conditionally altruistic worker obtains higher expected utility than
when the equilibrium contract (bp;sp) is o⁄ered.
293. The screening contraint SCC is satis￿ed, i.e. the egoistic worker￿ s par-
ticipation constraint PCL is violated.
That such a contract always exists can be shown as follows. Let ICC1￿
represent the same isopro￿t curve as ICC1￿ , but for a higher level of pro￿ts,




0 = E (￿p); (ICC1￿ )
Thus, ICC1￿represents all contracts (b0;s0) that yield the same pro￿t level
E (￿p) as the equilibrium contract (bp;sp), assuming the worker is condi-
tionally altruistic and that he believes that he is employed by an altruistic
principal. As higher pro￿t levels are represented by lower indi⁄erence curves,
all pooling contracts that yield higher monetary pro￿ts than (bl;sl) have a
corresponding isopro￿t curve ICC1￿below ICC1￿ .
Suppose the altruistic principal increases the base salary up to the point
that monetary pro￿ts equal equilibrium pro￿ts, i.e. b0 = bp, s0 > sp such that
ICC1￿holds. There are two cases. First, the screening constraint SCC is
satis￿ed. Clearly, such a contract meets all of the conditions for pro￿table
deviation. Second, the screening constraint SCC is violated. In that case
the isopro￿t curve ICC1￿always contains another contract that meets the
conditions outlined above, characterised by b0 2 (bp;1). As ICC1￿is nothing
but ICC1￿for a higher pro￿t level, it follows from the properties of ICC1￿
that for b0 = bp, s0 > sp, while for b0 = 1 PCL is violated (or SCC satis￿ed).
Thus, in this case there always exists a contract b0 2 (bp;1) and corresponding
base salary s0 such that PCL and ICC1￿are exactly satis￿ed. This contract
therefore also yields a conditionally altruistic worker higher utility: increas-
ing the base salary until PCL is satis￿ed, while keeping b constant, gives a
conditionally altruistic worker a higher utility than in equilibrium. As the
participation constraint of a conditionally altruistic worker is steeper than
PCL, o⁄ering b0 2 (bp;1) further increases his utility.
7.2 Proof of proposition 4
As ICC1 is binding, the altruistic principal pays a higher expected total
compensation if and only if e￿h > e￿l. Inserting expressions for e⁄ort, bl and
bh into this condition, we obtain after considerable rewriting:
(1 ￿ ￿)r￿2￿h(￿h)
(1 + ￿r￿2)
￿h(￿h) + r￿￿2 ￿ 1
￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)[1 ￿ ￿h(￿h)]
2 + ￿r￿2 > 0;
implying that the altruist pays more if and only if
￿h(￿h) + r￿￿
2 > 1:
307.3 Proof of lemma 4
It follows from straightforward rewriting of ICC1 that sICC1
h is de￿ned as
s
ICC1
h = (1 ￿ bh)e￿h ￿ (1 ￿ bl)e￿l ￿ sl;
or rewritten, using equations (5) and (6):
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Inspection of the derivative with respect to bh proves that sICC1
h initially
increases in the bonus provided (1 ￿ ￿)￿h(￿h) < 1
2, but always decreases in






￿2[bh + (1 ￿ ￿)￿h(￿h)(1 ￿ bh)] + 1
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:
7.4 Proof of lemma 5













h decreases in the bonus by assumption, as we imposed that
￿r￿2 < 1 to prevent un upward slope. For ease of comparison, I provide the












h follows from rewriting PCH:
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Keeping E(￿h) constant at its equilibrium level E (￿￿
l) and taking the deriv-
ative with respect to bh, it can easily be seen that compared to PCL, PCH














317.5 Proof of lemma 6
Because both ICC1￿and SCC are binding, the altruistic principal maximizes
his payo⁄ by o⁄ering a contract such that both constraints hold with equal-
ity. To show that such a contract always exists, ￿rst note that for bh = bl,
ICC1￿requires a higher base salary sh than SCC. Since for a given bonus, a
conditionally altruistic worker exerts more e⁄ort when he believes that the
principal is an altruist, signaling is only credible if sh > sl. It can be shown
that when bh = 1, ICC1￿always allows for a lower base salary than SCC,
and hence an intersection point on the interval (bl;1) always exists.
Recall that sPCL
h denotes the maximum salary SCC allows for, see lemma
5. Inserting bh = 1 into SCC, ￿sPCL
h describes a sel￿sh worker￿ s willingness
to pay for the ￿rm:
￿s
PCL











h denotes the base salary that keeps the egoistic principal
from imitating, see lemma 4. As ICC1￿is nothing but a special case of ICC1,
sICC10
h can be obtained by inserting ￿ = 0 into sICC1
h . Inserting bh = 1 into
ICC1￿ , we obtain that ￿sICC10
h = E (￿￿
l). Thus, the maximum amount the
altruistic principal can receive for the ￿rm (￿sICC10
h ) is equal to the egoistic
principal￿ s expected equilibrium pro￿ts. Using equations (8) and (10), we
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Since bl is the surplus maximizing bonus when workers are egoistic, E (￿￿
l) >
￿sPCL
h , implying that sICC10
h < sPCL
h when bh = 1.
7.6 Proof of proposition 5
By lemma 6, the equilibrium contract satis￿es ICC1￿and SCC with equality,
and such a contract always exists for bh 2 (bl;1). The altruistic principal
prefers this contract over possible contracts that also satisfy ICC1￿and SCC
with equality for bh < bl. As the principal￿ s monetary payo⁄ is constrained
by ICC1￿ , he chooses the contract that maximizes a conditionally altruistic
worker￿ s utility. By lemma 5, a conditionally altruistic worker￿ s indi⁄erence
curve has a steeper slope than an egoistic worker￿ s indi⁄erence curve. Hence,
utility of a conditionally altruistic worker is maximized when the principal
chooses bh 2 (bl;1) rather than bh < bl. The downward sloping indi⁄erence
curves imply that sh < sl.
327.7 Proof of proposition 7
To show under what conditions the altruistic principal prefers to screen, ￿rst
note that when ￿h(￿h) = 0, the payo⁄ is equal in both equilibria. I now
analyze how the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ changes when ￿h(￿h) increases
in both equilibria, where the change in the principal￿ s expected payo⁄ is
equal to the change in the worker￿ s expected utility.
In a separating equilibrium where the principal does not screen, the e⁄ect
of a change in ￿h(￿h) on total utility is given by ￿
dE(ul)







+ (1 ￿ ￿)
dE(uh)
d￿h(￿h)








This has a simple interpretation; the gain in total utility when ￿h(￿h) in-
creases is equal to the additional productivity of the reciprocal type (re￿ ected
in the base salary), plus his increased utility from the immaterial aspect of
the job. Worker￿ s utility is convex in ￿h(￿h), because bh is decreasing and
hence
dehh
d￿h(￿h) is increasing in ￿h(￿h).
Similarly, in a separating and screening equilibrium the e⁄ect of a change
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The ￿rst part is negative and represents the loss in worker utility because
bh is suboptimally high. The second part has a similar interpretation as in
a signaling equilibrium, but keeping the bonus constant, it is larger because
the worker is reciprocal with probability 1 instead of (1 ￿ ￿). The ￿rst part
is zero if ￿h(￿h) = 0, but becomes smaller (increases in absolute value) when
￿h(￿h) becomes larger. The second part is concave in ￿h(￿h), because bh is
increasing and hence
dehh







d￿h(￿h), the separating and screen-
ing equilibrium is always preferred for ￿h(￿h) su¢ ciently close to zero. When
￿h(￿h) increases, the cost of distorting the bonus becomes more severe, and
at some point the standard separating equilibrium will be preferred. The
larger the fraction of sel￿sh workers ￿, the higher the values of ￿h(￿h) that
sustain a screening equilibrium.
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